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VPNs
and Firewalls |
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With the VPN server in
front of the firewall attached to the Internet, as shown in the figure below,
you need to add packet filters to the Internet interface that only allow VPN
traffic to and from the IP address of the VPN server's interface on the
Internet.
For inbound traffic, when
the tunneled data is decrypted by the VPN server it is forwarded to the
firewall, which employs its filters to allow the traffic to be forwarded to
intranet resources. Because the only traffic that is crossing the VPN server is
traffic generated by authenticated VPN clients, firewall filtering in this
scenario can be used to prevent VPN users from accessing specific intranet
resources.
Because the only Internet
traffic allowed on the intranet must go through the VPN server, this approach
also prevents the sharing of File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Web intranet
resources with non-VPN Internet users.

In a more common
configuration, illustrated in next figure, the firewall is connected to the
Internet and the VPN server is another intranet resource connected to a
demilitarized zone (DMZ). The DMZ is an IP network segment that typically
contains resources available to Internet users such as Web servers and FTP
servers. The VPN server has an interface on the DMZ and an interface on the
intranet.
In this approach, the
firewall must be configured with input and output filters on its Internet
interface to allow the passing of tunnel maintenance traffic and tunneled data
to the VPN server. Additional filters can allow the passing of traffic to Web
servers, FTP servers, and other types of servers on the DMZ.
Because the firewall does
not have the encryption keys for each VPN connection, it can only filter on the
plaintext headers of the tunneled data, meaning that all tunneled data passes
through the firewall. However, this is not a security concern because the VPN
connection requires an authentication process that prevents unauthorized access
beyond the VPN server.
Last maintained on Friday, December 18, 2009.